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Abstract
Recently, new defense techniques have been
developed to tolerate Byzantine failures for
distributed machine learning. The Byzantine
model captures workers that behave arbitrarily,
including malicious and compromised work-
ers. In this paper, we break two prevailing
Byzantine-tolerant techniques. Specifically
we show robust aggregation methods for syn-
chronous SGD – coordinate-wise median and
Krum – can be broken using new attack strate-
gies based on inner product manipulation. We
prove our results theoretically, as well as show
empirical validation.
1 INTRODUCTION
The security of distributed machine learning has drawn
increasing attention in recent years. Among the threat
models, Byzantine failures (Lamport et al., 1982) are
perhaps the most well-studied. In the Byzantine model,
workers can behave arbitrarily and maliciously. In addi-
tion, Byzantine workers are omniscient and can conspire.
Most of the existing Byzantine-tolerant machine-learning
algorithms (Blanchard et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Yin
et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2014; Su & Vaidya, 2016a;b;
Alistarh et al., 2018) focus on the protection of distributed
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
In this paper, we consider Byzantine-tolerant SGD in a
server-worker architecture (also known as the parame-
ter server architecture (Li et al., 2014a;b)), depicted in
Figure 3. The system is composed of server nodes and
worker nodes. In each epoch, the workers pull the latest
model from the servers, estimate the gradients using the
locally sampled training data, and then push the gradi-
ent estimators to the servers. The servers aggregate the
gradient estimators, and update the model by using the
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Figure 1: Illustration of failed Byzantine-tolerant SGD.
We execute distributed synchronous SGD on CIFAR-10
image classification, with 25 workers. Beginning from
the 100th epoch, we attack the a system by replacing
some workers with Byzantine workers. During the attack,
12 workers are Byzantine in the case of coordinate-wise
median, and 11 workers are Byzantine in the case of
Krum. The Byzantine workers push −g to the server,
where g is the true gradient.
aggregated gradients.
We consider Byzantine failures at a subset of the worker
nodes. Byzantine workers send arbitrary values instead
of the gradient estimators to the server. Such Byzantine
gradients are potentially adversarial, and this can result
in convergence to sub-optimum models, or even lead to
divergence. To make things worse, the Byzantine workers
can spy on the information at any server or at any honest
worker (omniscience). Byzantine gradients can thus be
tailored to have similar variance and magnitude as the
correct gradients, which makes them hard to distinguish.
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Additionally, in different iterations, different subsets of
workers can behave in a Byzantine manner, evading de-
tection. Existing literature assumes that less than half of
the workers are Byzantine in any iteration.
Compared to traditional Byzantine tolerance in distributed
systems (Lynch, 1996; Avizienis et al., 2004; Tanenbaum
& Van Steen, 2007; Fischer et al., 1982), Byzantine toler-
ance in distributed machine learning has unique properties
and challenges. Traditional Byzantine tolerance attempts
to reach consensus on correct values. However, machine
learning algorithms do not need to reach consensus. Fur-
ther, even non-Byzantine-tolerant machine learning algo-
rithms can naturally tolerate some noise in the input and
during execution (Xing et al., 2016). Thus for distributed
SGD, existing techniques for Byzantine-tolerant execu-
tion guarantee an upper-bound on the distance between
the aggregated approximate gradient (under Byzantine
workers) and the true gradient (Blanchard et al., 2017;
Yin et al., 2018).
A deeper introspection reveals, however, that what really
matters for gradient descent algorithms is the direction of
the descent. As shown in Figure 2, to let the gradient de-
scent algorithm make progress, we need to guarantee that
the direction of the aggregated vector agrees with the true
gradient, i.e., the inner product between the aggregated
vector and the true gradient must be non-negative. This
can be violated by an attack that makes the inner product
negative. We call this class of new attacks “inner product
manipulation attacks”.
Figure 2: Descent Direction. The blue arrows represent
the directions which agree with the steepest descent di-
rection (negative gradient). The red arrows represent
directions which agree with the steepest ascent direction
(gradient).
We observe that the bounded distance between the ag-
gregated value and the true gradient guaranteed by exist-
ing techniques is not enough to defend distributed syn-
chronous SGD against inner product manipulation attacks.
For example, for the coordinate-wise median, if we put
all the Byzantine values on the opposite side of the true
gradient, the inner product between the aggregated vector
and the true gradient can be manipulated to be negative.
In this paper, we study how inner product manipulation
makes Byzantine-tolerant SGD vulnerable. We conduct
case studies on coordinate-wise median (Yin et al., 2018)
and Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017). Figure 1 gives a
glimpse of how bad the effect of the attack can be. In a
nutshell, creating gradients in the opposite direction with
large magnitude crashes coordinate-wise median, while
creating gradients in the opposite direction with small
magnitude crashes Krum. We provide theoretical analysis
as well as empirical results to validate these findings.
Based on these results, we argue that there is a need to
revise the definition of Byzantine tolerance in distributed
SGD. We provide a new definition, and study its satisfac-
tion on two prevailing robust distributed SGD algorithms,
theoretically and empirically. In summary, our contribu-
tions are:
• We break two prevailing Byzantine tolerant SGD algo-
rithms – coordinate-wise median (Yin et al., 2018) and
Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017) – using a new class of
attacks called inner production manipulation attacks.
We theoretically prove that under certain conditions,
we can backdoor these two algorithms, even when the
assumptions and theorems presented in these papers
are valid.
• We show how to design Byzantine gradients to com-
promise the robust aggregation rules. We conduct ex-
periments to validate further.
• Following our theoretical and empirical analysis, we
propose a revised definition of Byzantine tolerance for
distributed SGD.
2 RELATED WORK
Robust estimators such as the median are well stud-
ied, and can naturally be applied to Byzantine tolerance.
Coordinate-wise median is one approach that general-
izes the median to high-dimensional vectors. In Yin
et al. (2018), statistical error rates are studied for using
coordinate-wise median in distributed SGD.
Blanchard et al. (2017) propose Krum, which is not based
on robust statistics. For each candidate gradient, Krum
computes the local sum of squared Euclidean distances
to the other candidates, and outputs the one with minimal
sum.
In this paper, we focus on coordinate-wise median and
Krum. There are other Byzantine-tolerant SGD algo-
rithms. For example, Bulyan (Guerraoui et al., 2018)
is built based on Krum, which potentially shares the
same flaws. DRACO (Chen et al., 2018) uses coding
theory to ensure robustness, and is different from the
other Byzantine-tolerant SGD algorithms.
Recently, an increasing number of papers propose attack
mechanisms to break the defense of machine learning
in various scenarios. For example, Athalye et al. (2018)
propose attack techniques using adversarial training data.
Bhagoji et al. (2018); Bagdasaryan et al. (2018) break the
defense of federated learning (McMahan et al., 2016). In
this paper, we focus on attacking distributed synchronous
SGD using adversarial gradients sent by Byzantine work-
ers.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we focus on distributed synchronous
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with Parameter
Server (PS). In this section, we formally introduce dis-
tributed synchronous SGD and the threat model of Byzan-
tine failures.
Figure 3: Worker-Server Architecture
3.1 STOCHASTIC GRADIENT DESCENT
We consider the following optimization problem:
min
x∈Rd
F (x),
where F (x) = Ez∼D[f(x; z)] is a differentiable function,
z is sampled from some unknown distribution D, d is
the number of dimensions. We assume that there exists
at least one minimizer of F (x), which is denoted by x∗,
where ∇F (x∗) = 0.
This problem is solved in a distributed manner with m
workers. In each iteration, each worker will sample n
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data points
from the distribution D, and compute the gradient of the
local empirical loss Fi(x) = 1n
∑n
j=1 f(x; z
i,j),∀i ∈
[m], where zi,j is the jth sampled data on the ith worker.
The servers will collect and aggregate the gradients sent
by the workers, and update the model as follows:
xt+1 = xt − γtAggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}),
where Aggr(·) is an aggregation rule (e.g., averaging),
and v˜ti is the gradient sent by the ith worker, γ
t is
the learning rate in the tth iteration. For an honest
worker, v˜ti = ∇Fi(xt) is an unbiased estimator such
that E[∇Fi(xt)] = ∇F (xt). When all the workers are
honest, the most common choice of the aggregation rule
Aggr(·) is averaging:
Aggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}) =
1
m
∑
i∈[m]
v˜ti .
The detailed algorithm of distributed synchronous SGD
with aggregation rule Aggr(·) is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Synchronous SGD with Robust
Aggregation
Server
x0 ← rand() {Initialization}
for t = 0, . . . , T do
Broadcast xt to all the workers
Wait until all the gradients {v˜ti : i ∈ [m]} arrive
Compute ¯˜vt = Aggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]})
Update the parameter xt+1 ← xt − γt ¯˜vt
end for
Worker i = 1, . . . ,m
for t = 0, . . . , T do
Receive xt from the server
Draw the samples, compute, and send the gradient
vti = ∇F ti (xt) to the server
end for
3.2 THREAT MODEL
In the Byzantine failure model, the gradients sent by ma-
licious workers can take an arbitrary value:
v˜ti =
{
∗, if ith worker is Byzantine,
∇Fi(xt), otherwise,
(1)
where “∗” represents arbitrary values.
Formally, we define the threat model of Byzantine failure
as follows.
Definition 1. (Threat Model (Blanchard et al., 2017;
Chen et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018)). In the tth iteration,
let {vti : i ∈ [m]} be i.i.d. random vectors in Rd, where
vti = ∇Fi(xt). The set of correct vectors {vti : i ∈ [m]}
is partially replaced by arbitrary vectors, which results in
{v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}, as defined in Equation (1). In other words,
a correct gradient is∇Fi(xt), while a Byzantine gradient,
marked as “∗”, is assigned arbitrary value. We assume
that q out of m vectors are Byzantine, where 2q < m.
Furthermore, the indices of faulty workers can change
across different iterations. If the failures are caused by
attackers, the threat model includes the case where the
attackers can collude.
The notations used in this paper is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Notations
Notation Description
m Number of workers
n Minibatch size on each worker
T Number of iterations
[m] Set of integers {1, . . . ,m}
q Number of Byzantine workers
γ Learning rate
x Model parameters
v˜ti Gradient sent by the ith worker
in the tth iteration, potentially Byzantine
vti Correct gradient produced by the ith worker
in the tth iteration
‖ · ‖ All the norms in this paper are l2-norms
〈a, b〉 Inner product between a and b
4 DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
In this section, we introduce two prevailing robust ag-
gregation rules against Byzantine failures in distributed
synchronous SGD: coordinate-wise median and Krum.
For the remainder of this paper, we ignore the iteration
superscript t in v˜ti and v
t
i for convenience.
4.1 COORDINATE-WISE MEDIAN
Definition 2. (Coordinate-wise Median (Yin et al., 2018))
We define the coordinate-wise median aggregation rule
Median(·) as
med = Median({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}),
where for any j ∈ [d], the jth dimension of med
is medj = median ({(v˜1)j , . . . , (v˜m)j}), (v˜i)j is the
jth dimension of the vector v˜i, median(·) is the one-
dimensional median.
4.2 KRUM
Definition 3. (Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017))
Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) = v˜k, k = argmin
i∈[m]
KR(v˜i),
KR(v˜i) =
∑
i→j
‖v˜i − v˜j‖2,
where i → j are the indices of the m − q − 2 nearest
neighbours of v˜i in {v˜j : j ∈ [m], i 6= j} as measured by
squared Euclidean distance.
For convenience, we refer to the coordinate-wise median
and Krum as Median and Krum.
5 ATTACK TECHNIQUES
In this section, we revise the definition of Byzantine toler-
ance in distributed synchronous SGD. Then, we theoreti-
cally analyze the Byzantine tolerance of coordinate-wise
median and Krum, and show that under certain condi-
tions, these two robust aggregation rules are no longer
Byzantine-tolerant.
5.1 INNER PRODUCT MANIPULATION
In the previous work on Byzantine-tolerant SGD algo-
rithms, most of the robust aggregation rules only guar-
antee that the robust estimator is not arbitrarily far away
from the mean of the correct gradients. In other words,
the distance between the robust estimator and the correct
mean is upper-bounded. However, for gradient descent
algorithms, to guarantee the descent of the loss, the inner
product between the true gradient and the robust estimator
must be non-negative:
〈∇F (x), Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})〉 ≥ 0,
so that at least the loss will not increase in expectation.
In particular, bounded distance is not enough to guaran-
tee robustness, if the attackers manipulate the Byzantine
gradients and make the inner product negative.
The intuition underlying the inner product manipulation
attack is that, when gradient descent algorithm converges,
the gradient ∇F (xt) approaches 0. Thus, even if the
distance between the robust estimator and the correct
mean is bounded, it is still possible to manipulate their
inner product to be negative, especially when the upper
bound of such distance is large.
We formally define a revised version of Byzantine
tolerance for distributed synchronous SGD (DSSGD-
Byzantine tolerance):
Definition 4. (DSSGD-Byzantine Tolerance) Without
loss of generality, suppose that in a specific itera-
tion, the server receives (m − q) correct gradients
V = {v1, . . . , vm−q} and q Byzantine gradients U =
{u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the correct gradients have
the same expectationE[vi] = g,∀i ∈ [m−q]. An aggrega-
tion rule Aggr(·) is said to be DSSGD-Byzantine-tolerant
if
〈g, E [Aggr(V ∪ U)]〉 ≥ 0.
With the revised definition, now we theoretically analyze
the DSSGD-Byzantine tolerance of coordinate-wise me-
dian and Krum.
Remark 1. Note that we do not argue that the theo-
retical guarantees in the previous work are wrong. In-
stead, our claim is that the theoretical guarantees on the
bounded distances are not enough to secure distributed
synchronous SGD. In particular, DSSGD-Byzantine toler-
ance is different from the Byzantine tolerance proposed
in previous work.
5.2 COORDINATE-WISE MEDIAN
The following theorem shows that under certain condi-
tions, Median is not DSSGD-Byzantine-tolerant.
Theorem 1. We consider the worst case where m −
2q = 1. The server receives (m − q) correct gradients
V = {v1, . . . , vm−q} and q Byzantine gradients U =
{u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the stochastic gradients
have identical expectation E[vi] = g,∀i ∈ [m− q], and
non-zero coordinate-wise variance E[((vi)j − gj)2] ≥
σ2,∀i ∈ [m − q], j ∈ [d], where (vi)j is the jth coor-
dinate of vi, and gj is the jth coordinate of g. When
maxj∈[d] |gj | < σ√m−q−1 , there exist Byzantine gradi-
ents U = {u1, . . . , uq} such that
〈g, E [Median(V ∪ U)]〉 < 0.
Proof. (sketch) Since median is independently taken in
each coordinate, it is sufficient to prove Byzantine vulnera-
bility for one coordinate or scalars. Thus, for convenience,
with a little bit abuse of notation, we suppose that the
correct gradients V = {v1, . . . , vm−q} and q Byzantine
gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq} are all scalars. We only need
to show that under certain attacks, the aggregated value
Median(V ∪ U) has a different sign than∑i∈[m−q] vi.
Without loss of generality, we assume that g =
1
m−1
∑
i∈[m−q] E[vi] > 0 (the mirror case can be easily
proved with a similar procedure). The Byzantine gradi-
ents are all assigned negative value: ui < 0,∀i ∈ [q]. Fur-
thermore, we make the Byzantine gradients small enough
such that ui < min(V),∀i ∈ [q].
By sorting the correct gradients, we can define the se-
quence {v1:m−q, . . . , vm−q:m−q}, where vi:m−q is the
ith smallest element in {v1, . . . , vm−q}:
v1:m−q ≤ v2:m−q ≤ · · · ≤ vm−q:m−q.
We also define the expectation of the ith smallest element:
µi:m−q = E[vi:m−q].
Then, it is easy to check that Median(V ∪ U) = v1:m−q,
and E [Median(V ∪ U)] = µ1:m−q .
Using Theorem 1(b) from Hawkins (1971) (equiv. 9(a)
from Arnold et al. (1979)), we have
µ1:m−q ≤ g − σ√
m− q − 1 .
Thus, when g < σ√
m−q−1 , E [Median(V ∪ U)] is nega-
tive.
Remark 2. When gradient descent converges, the ex-
pectation of the gradient g approaches 0. Furthermore,
since the gradient produced by the correct workers are
stochastic, the variance always exists. Thus, eventually,
the condition maxj∈[d] |gj | < σ√m−q−1 will be satisfied.
To make things worse, the closer SGD approaches a crit-
ical point, the less likely the coordinate-wise median is
DSSGD-Byzantine-tolerant.
Remark 3. The proof of Theorem 1 provides the intuition
of constructing adversarial gradients for the attackers. In
practice, in each coordinate, the attackers only need to
guarantee that all the Byzantine values are much smaller
than the smallest correct value if the correct expectation
is positive, or much larger than the largest correct value if
the correct expectation is negative. Then, hopefully, if the
variance is large enough, the smallest/largest value has
the opposite sign to the correct expectation. Then, the at-
tackers can successfully manipulate the aggregated value
into the opposite direction to the correct expectation.
5.2.1 Toy Example
We provide an 1-dimensional toy example to illustrate
how easily Median can fail. Suppose there are 3 correct
gradients V = {−0.1, 0.1, 0.3} with the mean 0.1, and
2 Byzantine gradient U = {−4,−2} with the negative
mean −3. According to Definition 2, it is easy to check
that Median(U ∩V) = −0.1, which means that Median
produces a value with the opposite sign of the mean of
the correct gradients.
5.3 KRUM
The following theorem proves that under certain condi-
tions, Krum is not DSSGD-Byzantine-tolerant. Note that
Krum requires that m− 2q > 2.
Theorem 2. We consider the worst case where m −
2q = 3. The server receives (m − q) correct gradi-
ents V = {v1, . . . , vm−q} and q Byzantine gradients
U = {u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the stochastic
gradients have identical expectation E[vi] = g,∀i ∈
[m − q]. We define the mean of the correct gradients
v¯ = 1m−q
∑
i∈[m−q] vi. We assume that the correct gradi-
ents are bounded by ‖vi− v¯‖2 ≤ ‖v¯‖2,∀i ∈ [m−q]. Fur-
thermore, we assume that vi 6= vj ,∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [m− q],
and ∃β such that ‖vi− vj‖2 ≥ β2,∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [m− q].
We take u1 = u2 = · · · = uq = −v¯, where  is a small
positive constant value such that 2‖v¯‖2 ≤ β2. When
(m− q) is large enough: m− q > 2(+2)22 + 2, we have
〈g, E [Krum(V ∪ U)]〉 < 0.
Proof. (sketch) For ∀u ∈ U , u = −v¯, where v¯ =
1
m−1
∑
i∈[m−q] vi.
Since any u ∈ U is identical, the nearest (m − q − 4)
neighbours of u must belong to U . The remaining (m−
q−2)− (m−q−4) = 2 nearest neighbours must belong
to the set of correct gradients V . Thus, we have
KR(u) ≤ 2‖v¯ + v¯ + v¯‖2 = 2(+ 2)2‖v¯‖2.
For the correct gradients ∀v ∈ V , there are two cases:
• Case 1: There are some u ∈ U which belong to the
(m− q − 2) nearest neighbours of v.
Suppose there are a1 nearest neighbours in V and a2
nearest neighbours in U , where a1 + a2 = m− q − 2.
Since the correct gradients are bounded by ‖vi− v¯‖2 ≤
‖v¯‖2,∀i ∈ [m− q], it is easy to check that ‖v−u‖2 ≥
2‖v¯‖2. Thus, we have
KR(v) ≥ a1β2 + a2‖v − u‖2 ≥ (m− q − 2)2‖v¯‖2.
• Case 2: There are no u ∈ U which belong to the
(m− q − 2) nearest neighbours of v. Thus, we have
KR(v) ≥ (m− q − 2)β2 ≥ (m− q − 2)2‖v¯‖2.
In both cases, we have KR(v) ≥ (m − q − 2)2‖v¯‖2.
Thus, when (m−q) is large enough: m−q > 2(+2)22 +2,
we have
KR(u) ≤ 2(+ 2)2‖v¯‖2 < (m− q − 2)2‖v¯‖2
≤ KR(v).
As a result, Krum(V ∩ U) = u = −v¯. Thus,
E [Krum(V ∩ U)] = −g.
Remark 4. In the theorem above, we assume that all the
correct gradients are inside a Euclidean ball centered at
their mean: ‖vi − v¯‖2 ≤ ‖v¯‖2,∀i ∈ [m − q]. Such as-
sumption can not always be satisfied, but it is reasonable
that the random samples are sometimes inside such a Eu-
clidean ball, if the variance is not too large. On the other
hand, we assume that the pair-wise distances between the
correct gradients are lower-bounded by β > 0. Almost
surely, such β exists, no matter how small it is. Note that
the Byzantine attackers are supposed to be omniscient.
Thus, the attackers can spy on the honest workers, and
obtain V and β. Then, the attackers can choose an  such
that 2‖v¯‖2 ≤ β2. Finally, we only need the number of
workers to be large enough, so that m− q > 2(+2)22 + 2.
Remark 5. The proof of Theorem 2 provides the intu-
ition of constructing adversarial gradients for the at-
tackers. In practice, the attackers only need to assign

m−q
∑
i∈[m−q] vi to all the Byzantine gradients, with an
 > 0 small enough.
Remark 6. Note that in Blanchard et al. (2017), Krum
requires the assumption that cσ < ‖g‖ for convergence,
where c is a general constant, σ is the maximal variance
of the gradients, and g is the gradient in expectation.
Note that ‖g‖ → 0 when SGD converges to a critical
point. Thus, such an assumption is never guaranteed to
be satisfied, if the variance is non-zero. Furthermore, the
better SGD converges, the less likely such an assumption
can be satisfied.
5.3.1 Toy Example
Note that the assumptions made in Theorem 2 are suf-
ficient but not necessary conditions of the DSSGD-
Byzantine vulnerability of Krum. In practice, it can be
easier to find an  that crashes Krum, especially for 1-
dimensional cases.
We provide an 1-dimensional toy example to show
how easily Krum can fail. Suppose there are 6 cor-
rect gradients V = {0, 0.02, 0.14, 0.26, 0.38, 0.5}
with the mean 0.2167, and 3 Byzantine gradi-
ent U = {−0.1,−0.1,−0.1} with the negative
mean −0.1. According to Definition 3, the cor-
responding function values KR(·) of U ∩ V =
{−0.1,−0.1,−0.1, 0, 0.02, 0.14, 0.26, 0.38, 0.5} are
{0.0244, 0.0244, 0.0244, 0.0304, 0.0436, 0.1060, 0.1440,
0.2160, 0.4320}. Thus, Krum(U ∩ V) = −0.1, which
means that Krum chooses the Byzantine gradient with
the opposite sign of the mean of the correct gradients.
6 CASE STUDY
In this section, we implement special attack strategies for
Median and Krum, and evaluate our attack strategies
on a real-world application. The attack strategies are
designed by using the intuitions underlying Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, which are mentioned in Remark 3 and
Remark 5.
6.1 DATASETS AND EVALUATION METRICS
We conduct experiments on the benchmark CIFAR-10
image classification dataset (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009),
which is composed of 50k images for training and 10k
images for testing. We use a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed by 1
fully connected layer. The detailed network architecture
can be found in the appendix. For any worker, the mini-
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Figure 4: Convergence on training set, using Median as aggregation rule.  ∈ {10, 0.1, 0,−10}.
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(a) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set,  = 0.1
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(b) Cross Entropy on Training Set,  = 0.1
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(c) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set,  = 0.5
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(d) Cross Entropy on Training Set,  = 0.5
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(e) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set,  = 1
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(f) Cross Entropy on Training Set,  = 1
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Figure 5: Convergence on training set, using Krum as aggregation rule.  ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 10}.
batch size for SGD is 50.
In each experiment, we launch 25 worker processes. We
repeat each experiment 10 times and take the average. We
use top-1 accuracy on the testing set and the cross-entropy
loss function on the training set as the evaluation metrics.
We use the averaging, Median, and Krum with-
out attacks as the gold standard, which are referred
to as Mean without attack, Median without
attack, and Krum without attack. We start the
attack at different epochs, so that SGD can warm up and
make some progress first. We include some additional
experiments in the appendix.
6.2 MEDIAN
In each iteration, the server receives m = 25 gradients.
A randomly selected subset of q = 12 correct gradients
are replaced by Byzantine gradients. We define the set
of Byzantine gradients as U = {u1, . . . , u12}, and the set
of the remaining correct gradients as V = {v1, . . . , v13}.
Our attack strategy is as follows:
u1 = u2 = · · · = u12 = − 
13
13∑
i=1
vi.
According to Theorem 1 and Remark 3, Median is vul-
nerable to positive  with large magnitude ||.
We test the above attack strategy with different . The
results are shown in Figure 4. Median fails when  >
0. When  = 0, Median gets stuck and stops making
progress. When  < 0, Median successfully defends
against the attack.
6.3 KRUM
In each iteration, the server receives m = 25 gradients.
A randomly selected subset of q = 11 correct gradients
are replaced by Byzantine gradients. We define the set
of Byzantine gradients as U = {u1, . . . , u11}, and the set
of the remaining correct gradients as V = {v1, . . . , v14}.
Our attack strategy is as follows:
u1 = u2 = · · · = u11 = − 
14
14∑
i=1
vi.
According to Theorem 2 and Remark 5, Krum is vulnera-
ble to positive  with small magnitude ||.
We test the above attack strategy with different . The
results are shown in Figure 5. Krum fails when  > 0
is small. When  is large enough, Krum successfully
defends against the attack.
6.4 DISCUSSION
Surprisingly, both Median and Krum are more vulnera-
ble than we expected. Note that our theorems only analyze
the worst cases. There are other cases where Median
and Krum can fail.
For Median, even if we take  = 0, SGD still performs
badly. Theoretically, even if we do not use positive ,
small  can still enlarge the variance of SGD, which can
be potentially harmful to the convergence. We can see
that with large negative , the defense of Median is suc-
cessful. In our experiment, we reveal certain new vul-
nerabilities of Median in distributed synchronous SGD.
The experiments conducted by Yin et al. (2018) do not
fail because the attacker only changes the labels of the
poisoned training data by flipping a label ∈ {0, . . . , 9}
to 9− label. It is very likely that such an attack produces
Byzantine gradients surrounding the correct gradients
coordinate-wisely on both sides. However, according to
Theorem 1 and Remark 3, an effective attack should place
the Byzantine gradient on one and only one side of the
correct gradients, which is the side opposite to the mean
of the correct gradients, coordinate-wisely.
For Krum, small positive  makes SGD vulnerable. Fur-
thermore, even if we take  = 1, Krum still fails. In our
experiment, we reveal certain new vulnerability of Krum
in distributed synchronous SGD. The experiments con-
ducted by Blanchard et al. (2017) do not fail even though
a similar attack strategy called “omniscient” is conducted.
The reason is that, in the paper of Blanchard et al. (2017),
the attacker “proposes the opposite vector, scaled to a
large length”, which is similar to our attack strategy with
a large .
Guided by our theoretical analysis, we designed efficient
attack strategies for both Median and Krum. Our results
show that the definition of Byzantine tolerance for dis-
tributed synchronous SGD should be revised. Using our
definition of DSSGD-Byzantine tolerance, research can
be conducted to design better defense techniques.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose a revised definition of Byzantine tolerance for
distributed synchronous SGD. With the new definition, we
theoretically and empirically examine the Byzantine tol-
erance of two prevailing robust aggregation rules. Guided
by our theoretical analysis, attack techniques can be de-
signed to fail the aggregation rules. In the future, we hope
new defense techniques can be designed using our revised
definition of Byzantine tolerance.
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